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ceeding only after a balancing against the ideals of the juvenile court system,
even though these ideals do not coincide with realities of the system. Perhaps
it was just this type of situation that prompted the Warren Court to observe:6'
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise serious questions
as to whether actual performance measures well enough against theoretical purpose to make tolerable the immunity of the process from
the reach of constitutional guarantees applicable to adults.
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EMINENT DOMAIN: PUBLIC PURPOSE AND CONSERVATION
OF NATURAL RESOURCES
Seadade Industries,Inc. v. FloridaPower & Light Co.,
245 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1971)
Florida Power and Light Company condemned petitioner's land by eminent domain in order to construct a discharge water canal emptying into
Card Sound and Biscayne Bay. Seadade resisted the taking, claiming
it was adverse to the public interest and a gross abuse of the condemning
authority's discretion because approval from federal, state, and local pollution authorities had not been obtained prior to condemnation. Further,
there was evidence the heated discharge waters would damage the ecology
of Biscayne Bay.' Florida Power claimed the taking was for a public purpose
and necessary to its operation, that all statutory requirements pertaining to
condemnation had been met, 2 and that the condemnation proceeding could
not be disturbed unless Seadade demonstrated illegality, bad faith, or gross
abuse of discretion. 3 The Third District Court of Appeal found that the taking

A constitutional right to bail should also be extended to the juvenile system. The right
to bail is based upon a presumption of innocence and serves to prevent punishment, absent
an adjudication of guilt, while allowing the accused to assist unhampered in the preparation
of his defense. These considerations are as applicable to juveniles as to adults. The main
argument against extending bail to the juvenile system is based upon the child's need for
immediate care. Discharge to the child's parents may not provide this care; indeed, the
parents may be the source of the child's problem. In such instances, release may be extremely detrimental to the child. However, a general right to bail could still be accorded
with provision for an exception for those children dependent upon the state for adequate
care. See Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960).
64. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966).

1. The environmental issues of the instant case were also raised in federal court. See
United States v. Florida Power & Light Co., 311 F. Supp. 1391, 1392 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
2. FLA. STAT. §§73.021-.171; 74.011-.121; 361.01 (1969).
3. See Canal Authority v. Miller, 245 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1970).
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was for a necessary public purpose and that permission from various en-

vironmental agencies was not a condition precedent to condemnation. 4 On
certiorari the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed and HELD, where independent governmental agencies charged with safeguarding natural resources must
ultimately approve a project involving condemnation, the condemning authority must demonstrate a reasonable probability of obtaining approval and

that the taking in advance of approval will not result in irreparable harm
to natural resources should permission be denied.5
The 1968 Florida constitution delineates three areas in which a public
purpose is required: the pledging of credit by state and local governments,
tax exemptions for municipal properties used exclusively for municipal or
public purposes, 7 and the exercise of the power of eminent domain.8 The
public purpose criteria with regard to pledging of credit and the granting
of tax exemptions have become increasingly obfuscated, but in eminent
domain proceedings, Florida courts have consistently attempted to dichotomize public and private uses.' 0 Competing public interests,- however, have
complicated the problem of determining what constitutes a public purpose in
eminent domain proceedings.
In the past, Florida courts have accorded the delegatee of legislative eminent domain powers broad discretion in determining whether condemnation
is necessary, 12 the size and interest or the estate in land to be taken, 8 and
the public purpose for which the land will be used.- The requisite justification for the taking need only be reasonable, not absolute, 5 and may involve present as well as future plans.' 6 The size and interest in the land
may vary with the public use to .which it will be put' 7 but the public purpose
4. Seadade Indus., Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 282 So. 2d 46 (3d D.C.A. Fla.
1970).
5. 245 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1971). In the instant case the court found that the utility had
suiciently demonstrated that it could adjust the temperature of the discharged water if
necessary and therefore the discharge would probably be approved by the conservation
authorities. Id. at 215.
6. FIA. CONsr. art. VII, §10.
7. FLA. CONsT. art. VII, §3 (a).

8. FLA. CONSr. art. X, §6 (a).
9. See. Note, The "Public Purpose" and "Charitable" Tax Exemption in Florida: A
Judicial Morass, 19 U. FA. L. REv. 330, 337-39 (1966); Comment, Public Finance: A New
Test for Public Purpose, 19 U. FLA. L. REv. 747, 749-51 (1967).
10. See, e.g., Grubstein v. Urban Renewal Agency, 115 So. 2d 745, 749 (Fla. 1959);
Adams v. Housing Authority, 60 So. 2d 663, 669-70 (Fla. 1952).
11. In the instant case the public interest in utilities was in competition with the
public interest in preserving and maintaining natural resources.
12. Inland Waterway Dev. Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 160 Fla. 913, 916, 38 So. 2d 676,
678 (1948).
13. Wilton v. St. Johns County, 98 Fla. 26, 49, 123 So. 527, 535 (1929).
14. Id. at 43, 123 So. at 533.
15. Canal Authority v. Miller, 243 So. 2d 131, 134 (Fla. 1970).
16. Staplin v. Canal Authority, 208 So. 2d 853, 856 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1968); State Rd.
Dep't v. Southland, Inc., 117 So. 2d 512, 517 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1960)..
17. While the use may be local, limited, and for the inhabitants of a small or restricted
locality, the use and benefit must be available upon equal terms to all who are so situated
as to be able to enjoy the privilege. Wilton v. St. Johns County, 98 Fla. 26, 44, 123 So.
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must be fixed, definite, and one in which the state will exercise control
independently of any private rights.' 8 While the necessity of the taking, the

estate in land, and the public purpose are ultimately judicial questions, 19
the general rule has been that the condemning authority's determination of
these factors will not be disturbed by the courts in the absence of illegality,
bad faith, or gross abuse of discretion.20 The instant case added an additional
prerequisite to exercise of the eminent domain power: demonstration of reasonable probability of obtaining approval by conservation agencies. 21 The
case thereby augments the public purpose test by judicial construction of a
22
constitutional policy statement.
Although public concern for the environment and pollution is gathering
momentum, 23 the courts have relegated this problem to the legislative and

executive domains.' Concern for pollution has been evident
but violations of pollution control ordinances have been
portance in the determination of judicial disputes.4 In
the environment was evinced by the addition of article
the Florida constitution:

in court opinions,
of secondary im1968 concern for
II, section 7, to

It shall be the policy of the state to conserve and protect its natural
resources and scenic beauty. Adequate provision shall be made by
law for the abatement of air and water pollution and of excessive and
unnecessary noise.
While policy statements in constitutions are subject to criticism as a means
of weakening, substantive guaranteed rights, 2 6 the instant case provides the

first judicial interpretation of this section and acknowledges it as a requirement to be met in determining public purpose in eminent domain proceed-

527, 533-34 (1929).
18. Demeter Land Co. v. Florida Pub, Serv. Co., 99 Fla. 954, 964, 128 So. 402, 406 (1930).
19. See, e.g., Florida East Coast Ry. v. Shaw, 11 F.2d 653, 655 (S.D. Fla. 1926); Wilton
v. St. Johns County, 98 Fla. 26, 49, 123 So. 527, 535 (1929).
20. Canal Authority v. Miller, 243 So. 2d 151, 135 (Fla. 1970); Wilton v. St. Johns
County, 98 Fla. 26, 42, 123 So. 527, 533 (1929).
21. 245 So. 2d at 214.
22. FLA. CONST. art. II, §7. See text accompanying notes 23-30 infra.
23. See, e.g., Thoreau, Eminent Domain and the Environment, 56 CoRN E_. L. REv. 651
(1971); Vaughn, State Air Pollution Control Boards: The Interest Group Model and the
Lawyer's Role, 24 OKLA. L. Ray. 25 (1971); Note, Retroactive Laws-Environmental Law:
Retroactive Application of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 69 MICH. L.
REv. 732 (1971).
24. E.g., Ragland v. State Dep't of Transp., 242 So. 2d 475, 476 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
25. Cf. City of Miami v. City of Coral Gables, 233 So. 2d 7 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1970). In
enjoining the operation of a city incinerator, the court stated that violation of a county
pollution ordinance was merely evidence, not necessarily sufficient standing alone, to be
considered in determining whether a nuisance exists. Id. at 11.
26. To mix unenforceable statements of policy with a bill of rights, a judicially enforceable document, weakens the latter. Challenges to specific guarantees of rights can then
be met with the contention that the guarantees are also declarations of policy, not subject
to judicial enforcement. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAgUE, MODEL STATE CONSITrUTION 27 (6th
ed. 1963).
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ings affecting natural resources. 27 The court held that if the condemning
authority's project affects natural resources, and if independent authorities
guarding the public interest must approve the project, it is within the discretionary power of the judiciary to require the condemning authority to
reasonably demonstrate that: (1) the standards of the independent authorities will be met, and (2) condemnation and taking in advance of project
approval will not result in irreparable damage to natural resources should
the project approval be withheld.28 Thus, the condemning authority may be
required to show not only that it is taking land for a necessary public purpose, but also that it is safeguarding natural resources in the public interest.
While the condemning authority is still accorded discretion, it bears the burden of proof when conservation questions are presented to the court. 9
The instant case appears to give judicial support to preservation of
natural resources, but the effect of the holding is unclear. While it is progressive to recognize approval by public conservation agencies as integral to
condemnation projects involving the state's natural resources, the present
case does not require the condemning authority to obtain permission from
these agencies before proceeding with condemnation. The condemning authority must only reasonably demonstrate that permission is likely to be forthcoming and irreparableharm to natural resources will not occur.3 0 However,
the court made the ultimate determination of "reasonableness" on the basis
of criteria that were vague and a standard that was nonexistent.
Further, allowing the condemning authority to take a fee simple absolute
in land prior to obtaining project approval from public conservation authorities is contrary to the view that the power of eminent domain will be strictly
construed against the agency asserting the power.3 1 When the condemning
authority is allowed to take a fee simple, the authority remains owner of the
property even if project approval is denied. 2 If the use for which the land
was condemned is discontinued, there is no reversion to the private owner,
and the authority holding the land may devote it to a different use, leave
it idle, or sell it as a private owner.3 3 By allowing a fee to be taken prior
to project approval, the condemning authority is encouraged to make large

27. "The protection of resources, being a policy of the State, is an appropriate matter
for consideration in condemnation cases." 245 So. 2d at 214.
28. Id.
29. Id.

30. In Seadade, permission for the canal project had to be obtained from the US.
Atomic Energy Commission, the U.S. Department of the Interior, the Florida Pollution
Control Board, the Dade County Pollution Control Board, and the Central and Southern
Florida Flood Control District. Id. at 211.
31. Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Brevard County, 159 Fla. 311, 314, 31 So. 2d 48a, 485

(1947).
32. Carlor Co. v. City of Miami, 62 So. 2d 897, 900 (Fla. 1953); P. NicHOLs, Tm
§9.36, at 327-31 (3d ed. 1965).

LAw

OF EMINENT DOMAIN

33.

P. NicHoLs, supra note 32, at 331. But see Commentary, Abandonment of a Public

Works Project, 24 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 366 (1972). An exception to this rule is provided by
statute when a public road is abandoned or renounced. Title to the fee simple roadway

then vests in abutting private owners. Fr..

STAT.
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investments in the project. This, in turn, leads to the "sunk fund" argument
that due to the vast amount of capital already expended on the project, the
public interest is best served by the project's completion in spite of any ensuing environmental damage. 34 It is a recognized principle that while the
condemning authority is accorded discretion in the estate or interest in property acquired, it will not be permitted to take a greater quantity, interest, or
estate than is necessary to serve the public use for which the land is being
acquired." Therefore, to balance competing public interests, to protect the
private owner and the natural resources, and to encourage circumspection on
the part of the condemning authority, the court should require the condemning authority to take an estate less than a fee simple when exercising the power
of eminent domain prior to obtaining project approval. An easement 36 or a
defeasible fee 37 would be suitable. Thus, the condemning authority would
be less likely to proceed with a project until greater certainty of approval
from public conservation agencies was ascertained and would be unable to
rely on the "sunk fund" argument if approval were denied. Moreover, if approval were denied, the title and right to the lands would revert to the
private owner with appropriate adjustment between the parties.3 8
The instant case represents the first judicial attempt to enforce the constitutional policy of protecting the environment in Florida. As such, it is
a commendable step, but it is one that has raised many new questions and
possibly has created new problems that need judicial clarification3s
PATRICIA COMBS FAwsETr

34. This argument was used to encourage completion of the Central Florida Barge
Canal. See Little, New Attitudes About Legal Protection for the Remains of Florida's
Natural Environment, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 459, 492-93 (1971).
35. Staplin v. Canal Authority, 208 So. 2d 853, 856 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
36. See Florida Blue Ridge Corp. v. Tennessee Elec. Power Co., 106 F.2d 913, 916 (5th
Cir. 1939); Miller v. Florida Inland Navigation Dist., 130 So. 2d 615, 623-24 (1st D.C.A. Fla.
1961).
37. See 245 So. 2d at 216 (Ervin, J., specially concurring).
38. See Florida Blue Ridge Corp. v. Tennessee Elec. Power Co., 106 F.2d 913, 916 (5th
Cir. 1939); Miller v. Florida Inland Navigation Dist., 130 So. 2d 615, 623 (1st D.C.A. Fla.
1961). See also Commentary, supra note 33.
39. The instant case transposes a policy statement concerning natural resources into
a constitutional designation of "public purpose." By implication the "public purpose"
requirements of article VII, §3 and article VII, §10 of the 1968 Florida constitution may
now be limited by this policy of preserving natural resources. This infuses uncertainty
into the law. Also, by analogy to the instant case, constitutional and statutory policy statements concerning race, religion, or the right to work could be used in defining other
basic rights and limitations. For instance, could a hospital that practices racial discrimination now be refused its tax exemption? Cf. Maxwell v. Good Samaritan Hosp. Ass'n, Inc.,
204 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 1967).
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